MOLYNEUX'S QUESTION ANDTHE BERKELEIAN ANSWER Peter Baumann* In 1688, william Molyneux, an Irish philosopher and scientist specializingin optics, wrote a letter to John Locke in which he asked him a very interesting and important question about the senses. Locke did not unr*". (and it is not known why not). Fortunately, Molyneux raised the question again five years later in another letter. This time Locke respondedand he did so with enthusiasm. He so much liked Molyneux's question that he incorporated it into the second edition of his Essay concerning Huntan (Jnderstanding (1694) and discussed it shortly. Here is the veriion from the Essay which then became the starting point and main reference text of a long and controversial discussion and which only very slightly differs from Molyneux's version in the second letter and not much from ihe velsion of the first letter: Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his toLrch to clistinguish between a Cr-rbe, ancl a Sphere of the same rnetal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other, which is the cube, which the Sphere. Sr,rppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be rnade to see. Quaet'e, Whether by his sight, before he touch'd thern, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the cLrbe (Locke, Essay, II.9.g)r. Cnplrulo 12 + Swarthmore College.I Locke qr.rotes Molyneux, Letter to Locke, 2 March 1693,65l . Cf. also the earliel letter.by Molyneux: Molynetlx, I978, 482f . As overviews of the cliscussion on Molynenx's problem cf. Davis 1960, Morgan 1977,Pachetie 1997, arñ especially Degenaal 1996. PEIER B,ruN4ANN This quotation made the question famous; it has long been known under: the name "Molyneux's Question". Not everyone would want to go as far aì Emst Cassirer who thought that Molyneux's problem is the central probl in 18'r' Century epistemology (cf. Cassirer I 951, 108Ð. But I think it certainlylì is a very important problem with farreaching implications not just for ouÍ¡Í way of thinking about the different senses but also about cognition generally. lt is still very important today and there is not only au ongoing!ì controversial philosophical discussion but there is also ongoing empiricàL: research relevant to the question. : r -:lil: Now, one might think that Molyneux's question is straightforward and,.1, it is just the answer to it that would keep us busy. Unfortunately, it is notr; quite like that: The question itself is in need of further specification in many* respects. There is not just one way to interpret the question. And different I authors have interpreted it in different ways2. One could even argue that the,.ll full potential of Molyneux's question only became clearer later (with the::i distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual mental representations). l I arn going to start by taking a closer look at the question itself (1). Amongst ' those who answered the question in the negative or at least not in th-e.t:ì positive, George Berkeley is of particular interest because he argued for a very radical position. Most of his contribution to the discussion can be, found in his Essay tr¡wards a New Theory o/'Visbn (cf. on this aspect or¡¡1, Berkeley's work, e.g., Atherton 1990). I will give an exposition of his viewì (2) and then move on to a critical discussion of this kind of view, -wha{one could call the "Berkeleian view" (3). I think that the problems of what has become a standard negative answer to the question (mainly brought::¡l forward by empiricists) become vely clear in Berkeley's case and one canrìì also leam a lot frorn this. The closer one looks, the more one can be tempted to speak of Molyneux'l questions rather just Molyneux's question. To start with, Molyneux ts,' ásking what wouid be the case aftei' the man has been made to see. But, what ãxactly does seeing involve here? It seems relatively uncontroversial-.'l that light of different iniensity and different wave-length (color) would fall onto the person's retinas. Or, as Locke (cf, Locke, Essay, II.9.8) puts lt: , there is "colour" as well as "shadow" and different "degrees of light ano , blightness". This is, of course, not sufficient for seging: The eyes and thq',,; brain of the acquisition of v states and able to see. But, three different MorY¡reux's Quesnorus a) Molyneux's,l 2 Fol a latl'rel unolthodox intcr'¡rletation of the ploblem as not haviug to clo with the rclatiou betweefi": sightandtouchcf.Berchielli 2002,49,62-64.HeillgSTholdsthatthereal ploblemhastodowitha'¡ plesrrpposed atomism of the senses. It seems to me, howcver', that the atomistn plesupposed høe iq'] b) c) EX she only ac( her new visri l'athel innocent She would see According to experience wouldi 3201É 376 on s (a), (b) and (c) (1) What kinds does the person This question (2) Can M her vision) relevant here. Bùt To be sure, and its connecti 218 which) ipsofacto A person who¡ apply these other conte than "concepts" ---,____ 3 Given the plausible' ence, it would be false waY as the eyes and the same kind of a Forthe sake ofsi 368ff'). MolYn.u* und' lf not indicated oth( aÞÞlication". That a Plies the concept, brtt distinguishes between do not find vely ill brain of the person also have to work in a certain way3. Now, after the acquisition of vision, Molyneux's person would experience new mental states and processes she was not able to experience before. She would be able to see. But, again: What exacfly does seeing involve here? There are three different main possibilities : a) Molyneux's person acquires three-dimensional (3-D) visual experiences; b) she only acquires two-dimensional (2-D) visual experiencesa; c) her new visual experiences lack any intentional content. According to (c), the person would neither have 2-D nor 3-D vision. she would see but she would not see something. In that sense, her visual experience would be purely "subjective" (like, e.g., pain) (cf. Kant, KrV, A 3201 É 376 on subjective and objective perceptions). (a), (b) and (c) are different answers to the question (1) What kinds of visual experience does Molyneux's person acquire? This question is not Molyneux's question. The question is not "What does the person come to see?" but rather: (2) Can Molyneux's person distinguish and tell (relying exclusively on her vision) which object is the globe and which is the cube? To be sure, the answer to (2) depends on the answer to (1). Hence, (1) is relevant here. But it is not Molyneux's question. Let me say a bit about (2) and its connection with (1). A person who is able to tell globes from cubes (and to tell which is which) ipsofacto has the concepts of globe and cube and is able to comectly apply these concepts to objectss. To be sure, Locke, Berkeley and many other contemporaries would rather speak of "abstract" or "general ideas" than "concepts". One has to be careful when using a term like "concept" Mo¡.y¡leux's Quesrroru ¡,¡lorrr¿ Bcnn,l I,tAN AN:jwER 3 Given the plausible thesis that there is no rnental diffelence without a physical or functional difference, it would be false to say that the eyes and blain of Molyneux's person work in exactly the same way as the eyes and brain ofa person who has never been blind: In that case they would both have the same kind of vision and Molyneux's question would not even arise. a For the sake of sirnplicity, I neglect other fonns of vision, like Malr''s 2,5-D vision (cf. Marr 1982., 268ff.). Molyneux and Locke celtainly did not think of snch possibilities. 5 Ifnot indicated otherwise, "application ofa coucept" will be used hele in the sense of"coLrect application". That a person cau cort'ectly apply a collcept does not urcan that she always cor.r'ectly applies tlre concept, lrut that she does so in a sufficient uuurber of cases. Cf. Levin 1986,248-252 wlto distinguishes between having a concept ancl being able to apply it; she uses this distinction (which l do not find very ilh.uninating) in the context of a discussion of the Molyneux and the qualia pr.oblern. 2t9 Pritl.:n B¡ur,r¡¡r¡: here because one might read a very different view of mental representation (e.g., Kant's) into authors of an earlier period. Noq perhaps the ability to make distinctions within one's visual field does not presuppose conceptual abilities. However, Molyneux's question (2) clearly asks for more: namely for the ability to identify objects as globes or cubes by sight. Ancl this presupposes that the person has the concepts of globe and cube and can apply them. According to the assumptions behind Molyneux's question, the person can already distinguish globes and cubes by touch (which captures three-dimensional spatial relations). 'We could also say that she already has the concepts of globe and cube and that she can apply them based on her three-dimensional tactile experiencesó. Molyneux's question can thus be reformulated in the following way: (3) Can Molyneux's person apply the concepts of globe and cube (which' she already can apply based on tactile experience) by exclusive reliance on her new visual experience? Putting the question like this, though, makes it obvious that Berkeley should have a problem even with accepting Molyneux's question. I will say more about this later but want to already flag the problem up right now But back to some basic aspects of Molyneux's question. Can the person apply one and the same concept (of a globe and of a cube) both as exclusively based on tactile experience and as exclusively based on visual experience? The answer to Molyneux's question (3) depends, as I already pointed out, on which of the alternative views (a), (b) or (c) one takes. If one accepts (c), then obviously one has to deny the questionT. The concepts of globe and cubeasappliedontlrebasisoftouchareobviouslyspatialnotions. If one àccepts (b), the problem arises whether or how one can apply concepts which arguably aie concepts of three-dimensional objects on the basis òf two-dimensional (visual) inforrnation. This is related to but not identical with the important question of how we get from 2-D vision to 3-D visions. I propose to go with (a) here. This interpretation does not bring up. sider issues und Uringi out the main problem in the most straightforward fashioni As we will see, Berkeley would not agree with this but we will get back tÓ' that. Like in the Molyneux's Some phi question becomei (' Cf., however, Senden 1932,266-278,299f. andValvo 1971, 23f.,26f.,35f. according to whom"'i:r! about two-di thel'e is empirical evidence which shows that the blind do not have any conception or idea of spac9'l'rl':'''¡ 7 Cf. Bolton lgg4,7g-83who thinks that Locke accepts (c). Cf. also Vicnne 1992, 664. Schumachgr'::'f circles rather tha Ms.,4-10 distinguishes two col'nrron interpletatious of Locke: Accolding to one, Locke accep.st (a); accolcling to the other; hc lathcl u...1ri, (c); giveu thc fir'st intet'pretation, Locke should haV'9'l appears to be mentioned above; answered Molyr-rcux's questior-r in the positive, according to Schttnrachel'. ii:.: s Some anthols, lrowever, hold that this is at least part of Molyncux's pt'oblem. I think this misses th4 when she mightìt One further Nouveaux Essais; point, but cf. Blandt l9'15,177; Lievels 1992,399-401,405-406,410,415;Waxman2002 220 time to adapt to switch from brie time helps us to ù the 6asis of what:r authors agree that ofresources does' One can distinsui I. The visual II. pnon which the In additi some indu globe from the visual ex In both cases, is between an However, it is -=---===q I do not intend to accepred (a), (b) or (c). 'u cf. Diderot, Lett¡e si 1976, 3o-32 ttrinkt Qr¡estion in the positi " cf., ho*.u.., Mu,kq: the Person needs somg-. agree. l2 cf. Lo.ke. Essay,ll Locke,2NIarch 1693, that \4o¡r,.,..,",, persc that. Like in the case of (b), it is an open question how one should answer Molyneux's questione. Some philosophers, like Diderot, hold that the main point of Molyneux's question becomes clearer if one reformulates it and poses it as a problem about two-dimensional rather than three-dimensional shapes (squáres and circles rather than,cubes and globes)10. However, since the sensè of touch appears to be essentially three-dimensional, and for the other reasons mentioned above, I prefer to go with (a). one further question is whether the person has to answer imrnediately -when she might still be "dazzled and confused by the strangeness" (Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais,II.9.8)or can take her time. perhaps she needs some time to adapt to the new circumstances (like our pupils when we suddenly switch from brightness to darkness) (cf. Gregory l9B7,95). But is this really an important question here? I do not think sorr. However, the question of time.helps us to understand what the truly important question ii here: on the basis of what can the person answer Molyneux's question? Almost all authors agree that she will be able to do so sooner or later. But what kinds of resources does she need to use in order to be able to answer the question? One can distinguish two possible answers here: L The visual experience, conceptual capacities and, perhaps, some a priori reasoning are sufficient to tell which object is the globe and which the cube; il. In addition to that, the person also needs further experience and some inductive reasoning (about the comelation between tactile and visual experiences). In both cases, one needs some experience in order to be able to tell the globe from the cube. Hence, it is not quite true to say that the alternative is between an empiricist and an apriorist answer to Molyneux's question. However, it is not astonishing that empiricists tend to hól¿ (II)12 whereas aNolls Btnr¡Lel¡ru A¡lswpn e I do not intend to decide here the diffìcult intelpretatoly question of whether Molyneux or Locke accepted (a), (b) or (c). l0 cf. Diderot, Leth'e sur les aveugles, 314-330,325 and,following hirn, Evans 19g5,365. Mackie 1976,30-32 thinks that Locke would have answerecl the two-dimensional version of Molyner.rx's question in the positive.r' Cf', lrowever, Marks 1g78,23f .accolcling to whorn Molyneux's question has to be ¿enied þeca¡se the person needs sotne time to able to answel it. Accolding to Belchielli 2002, 64, Locke would agree. D Cf. Locke, Es sq),lI.g.|whet'e he approvingly quotes Molyneux's answeL (cf. Molyneux, Letter to L.ocke,2 March 1693, 651). Cf. also Berkeley, Nett, Tlteot.),ofW.sion,eô 41, 79, 128, 135; hc thinks that Molyneux's person would not even be able to understand the problenr (cf. ibid., $ 135). 22t Ps ien Bauçt,q¡l¡¡ apriorists rather tend to hold (I)r3. This allows us to reformulate (3) and give-,;iì Molyneux's question a tnore precise fotm and will thus also enable us tQ.befiér understãnd the differenf un***tt givenla: ,.ii (4) Can Molyneux's person apply the concepts of globe and cube lwhich;i: she already can apply based on tactile experience) by exclusiveir;l reliance on her new visual experience and, perhaps, some a priori,r,iì reasoning (without further experience and inductive reasoning .: concerning the comelation between tactile and visual experience)? : What then should we say if it turned out that the person needs to touch tlie objects before she can tell the globe from the cube by looking at it? Suppose that touching the objects is a "merely causal" precondition for the use of the new visual experience by the person. There could be such a weird causal connection. This, however, would not constitute a reason to deny Molyneux's question (a). Only if touching the objects is (also) necessary because it delivers further information do we have a reason to deny the question. In other words, Molyneux's question is a question about justification: Does the person have sufficient information to tell cube from globe? Molyneux's question is not a descriptive, "de facto" question but iather a justificatory, "de jure" questionr5. That Molyneux's question should be taken in a de jure way, has not always been made clear enoughr6. 13 Ct. (with respect to a weakel version of Molyneux's question): Leibniz, Nottt,eaux E,ssaís,IL9.8. 14 Cf. fol a sinrilar way to put it: Evans 1985, 366. Campbe ll 1996a,302-304 argues that externalistn abont mental contetìt suggests a positive answer to Molyueux's question. This, however, seems tg rniss the point of Molyneux's ploblern: It presupposes that the relevant content is accessible to the person; hence, the question pl'esupposes some kind of couteut iuterualism. Cf. also the discussion betrveen Loar 1996, Ludwig 1996 and Carnpbell 1996b. ls Cf. Kant, KrV, A 84/ B I I 6. It cloes not nrattel here whethel we choose au "irrternalist" or an "extelnalist" cor.rception of justification (cf. Kornblith 200l , I -9). l(, Cf. lrowevel Evans 1985,376-378. --We have to rnake celtain rather obvious backgt'ound assurrptions: The conclitions of pelception are normal (wlratever that means in detail), there are no tlicks or pelcephral illusions involved, the objects are close et.rongh and visible ft'om a normal per' spective, etc.There are further questions about the conditiot.ts undel which Molyneux's person.is prrt to t|e test. Filst: Does she know in advance that she will see two objects, one of them aglobe ancl one of tl.reur a cube? If yes, it will, of course, be easiel fol her to pass the test. I will.focus here o¡ the stronger rather than the weakel version of Molyneux's sceuario and assume that the person docs not know in aclvancc that a cube and a globe will be plesented to lìer. Thct'e seems nothing in Ber.keley which woulcl suggcst that he hacl the weaker versiou in rnind. Intelestingly, Leibniz affirrns the weakel velsion of tlre question ancl denies the stlongel vet'siot-t: cf . Leibniz, Nouveaux Essats' IL9.8 (tr'.: Petet' Retnuant/ Jonathan Bennett). 222 Not long afreiì¡ the discussion ab''å Cheselden, an cataract operati The boy had vision after su problembuthis persons with retinas are still brightness and of their eyes. here. Cheseldenli¡ according to Chej nb Remembra Cheselden any Judgment [objects'] shape Thing from anothr did not present cats and dogs: " he was asham'd: he was observ'd,, So Puss! I shallr Molyneux, Loc.k I cat or a dog"a that what affects Essay,IL9.8)I8.,.'i. relevant empiri After from systematic a different mor4 confirmation of' quite clear in isn't. But from rr cf. cheselderr, ch. 4. For an extensiv9 8-82 and 82-lll.He ofcases u¡til 1930 cf: 18 Cheselden adds thôt: Cheselden, Accoutrt; Not long after Locke hacl published Molyneux's question in his Essay, the discussion about it was fuelled by new empirical data. In 1728, william Cheselden, an English surgeon, published a report about two successful cataract operations he had done on the eyes of a l3or I|-year-old boyr7. The boy had been bom blind or had lost his sight very early. He acquired vision after surgery. Apparently, Cheselden did not know about Molyneux's problern but his report is still very interesting in this context. Strictly speaking, persons with cataract like Cheselden's boy are not completely blind: Their retinas are still functional; they can usually perceive broad differences in brightness and can vaguely recognize hand movements directly in front of their eyes. This, however, does not seem to make a relevant difference here. Cheselden's patient might have had vision as a vely young infant but, according to Cheselden's title, this would have been "so early, that he had no Remembrance of ever having seen". Cheselden reports that "When he first saw, he was [...] far fiom making any Judgment about Distances"; "he could form no Judment of their [objects'] shape [...] He knew not the Shape of any Thing, nor any one Thing from another, however different in Shape, or Magnitude". Cheselden did not present cubes and globes to hirn but had something to report about cats and dogs: "Having often forgot which was the Cat, andwhich the Dog, he was asham'd to ask; but catching the Cat (which he knew by feeling) he was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, ancl then setting her down, saiã, So Puss! I shall know you another Time" (Cheselden, Account, 448). As Molyneux, Locke, and others would have said: He already knew how a cat or a dog "affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the Experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so'i (Locke, Essay,II.9.8)rs. . After cheselden, there have been much more directly or indirectly relevant empirical data (and not just observations fi"om case studies but alsô lrom systernatic experiments). Most of the recent data rather seem to suggest a different morale. However, many contemporaries took cheselden s as confirmation of the negative answer to Molyneux's question. Now, it is not quite clear in what sense this is an empirical question and in what sense it tsn't. But from the start, there have been philosophical responses to it. BeRxelern¡l At¡swens Molvr.trux's Qur,s'rron ¡¡lol I r Ilen x eLul,cN Altsu,¿n '? Cf. Cheselclen, Account. On Cheselclen's opelation aud other early opelations cf. Degenaar 1996, llt 4. Fot an extensive overview ovel opelations until 1 930 cf. Sel.rden 1 932, passim and especially 8-82 ancl 82-111. He thinks that the data suggest a negative arlswel to Molyncnx's questiotr. For a Iist ofcases nntil 1930 cf. Scnden 1932,304.Cf. fol later case studies Valvo 197l. -. Cheselden aclcls that the boy had difficr¡lties seeing realistic pictnres as leplcsenting something (cf. Cheselden, Account, 449). :' 223 Pr:'irn Beuvnu¡.r the one given by Molyneux himself and approvingly quoted by Locke: ,.:¡ The classical argument for a negative answer to Molyneux's quest Not. For though he has obtain'd the experience of, how a Globe, how a affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the Expelience, that what afféì: his touch so ol'so, rnust affect his sight so or so; Or that a protuberant aú in thé Cube. that plessed his hand uneqLrally. shall appear to his eye, as and radicalized tlrc ideas behind Locke's and Molyneux's answer (wtft ln lris ,Essay towards a New Theory of I/ision, Berkeley further developè-d echos in the Principles, the Three Dialogtes and early anticipations in thê does in the Cube (Locke, Essay, I1.9.8). P h ilo s op h ical Commenî ar ies). First, we should stress that Berkeley did not choose option (a) abov* according to him, Molyneux's person does not enjoy 3-D vision. The reasorl:,ì is sirnply that we can, strictly speaking, not see distance or distant objects; [...] so that in truth and strictness ofspeech I neithel see distance itsef$ the objects of sigltt; they are not otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear (Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, $$ 45-46. Cf. also $$ 126, 154, as well as Principles, $ 44; Three D ial o gu es, 20 l. P h i l os op h i c a l C otn nt en tat"i es, 21 5. ln Ph il o s oph i cal Comtnentaries 32, he says: "Molyneux's Blincl tnan woulcl not know the sphere or cube to be boclies ol extended at first sight"). The irnplications for Molyneux's person are clear. Berkeley points out [...] that a rnan bom blind, being macle to see, would, at first, have no idea of distance by sight (Berkeley, New Theor¡' of Vision, $ 4l). Because we do not have visual ideas of distance we also do not have visual ideas of three-dimensional objects (cf. Berkel ey, New Theory of Vision, $ 154, 133). In one paragraph of the Essay towards a New Theoty of Visíon Berkeley even seems tõ däny that one cân have two-dimensional visual ideas. A being which has no sense of touch but only one of vision could never attain to know so rnuch as the fir'st elernents of plane geometry' And pelhaps upon a nice enquiry it will be fourcl he cannot even have an idea of pláne figures any more than he can of solicls; since some idea of distance is necessaly to fonn the idea of a geometrical plane (Berkeley' 224 nor anything that I take to be at a distance. I say, neither distance nor things , placed at a distance are thetnselves, or theil ideas, truly perceivecl by sight. I [...] From what we have shewn it is a manifest conseqnence that the ideas , ofspace, outness, and things placed at a distance are not, strictly speaking;'$ ,:l: New Theor¡t of Vision, $ 155; cf. also $$ 157-158. Cf. also Philosophical Commentaries,32). However, this latter idea seems to go to far for Berkeley's own theoly: The way he describes the "naked" visual experience seems to require at least two-dimensional visual ideas (cf. Wilson 1999,261 but also Schumacher 2007). If distance or three-dimensional objects are not what we see, what then do we see? Berkeley says: All that is properly perceived by the visive faculty amounts to no rnore than colonrs, with their variations and different ploportions of light and shade (Berkeley, New Theorlt o.f Vi.sion, $ 156; cf. $$ 103, 129-130). Berkeley acknowledges again and again that we tend to think that we can see three-dimensional objects. However, this is an illusion. We can even find the beginning of an emor-theory in his writings which prefigure very similar accounts in Hume later. It is experience which establishes a regularity connection, a close correlation between the ideas of sight and the spatial, three-dimensional ideas of touch. The close "association" makes us think that we can really see distance and distant objects when really we can only feel that (cf. Berkeley, New Theory of Vision,0$ 41, 45-46). Only in a "secondary" sense (non-strictly) can we say that we see three-dimensionally (cf. Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, $ 50). What matters with respect to Molyneux's question is not so much the details of Berkeley's story about apparent 3-D vision and basic vision (as one could call it). Rather, what is most crucial is Berkeley's idea that our "tactile" concepts are radically different fiom our "visual" concepts ancl that a touched object is not and cannot be identical with any seen object: But if we take a close and accurate view of things, it rnust be acknowleclged that we never see and feel one and the sarne object. That which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another. If the visible figure and extension be not the same with the tangible figule and extension, we are not to infer that one and the same thing has divers extensions. The true consequence is that the objects of sight and touch are two distinct things. It rnay pelhaps require some thought rightly to conceive this distinction. And the difficulty seems not a little increased, because the cornbination of visible ideas hath constantly the sarne rlalne as the cornbination of tangible ideas wherewith it is connected: which doth of necessity arise frorn the r,rse ancl encl of language (Berkeley, New Theory of'Vision, $ 49)'0. Mouyrueux's Quesrron ¡,norne B¿tr¡Ler¡,N Ar{swen lt, at OS 46. 50, I I l, 136, Pt'inciple,s g 44,Three Dialogue.s,245, Philo,so¡thical Contnretttarie,s,226, ¿27. See also the slightly different eally rerrark itr Philo,sophical Cottttnenlat'ie.s,29:"Motion, figure 225 Pc'rsn B,rul'l¡t'lt t A bit later, Berkeley makes his point even more drastically: That which I see is only variety of light and colours. That which I feel is hald or soft, hot or cold, rougl.rt or smooth. What similitude, what connexion have those ideas with these? Or how is it possible that anyone should see l'eason to give one and the sarne name to combinations of ideas so very different befor'e he hacl experienced theil coexistence? (Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, $ 103. See on this point Wilson 1999). Berkeley stresses that there is not even a resemblance between ideas of sight and ideas of touch (Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, $ 117). Since there is nothing in cotnmon between these kinds of ideas, there also cannot be an abstract idea of extension based thereupon; Berkeley puts forward his fanrous critique of abstract ideas in this context, too (Berkeley, New Theory 'o.f Vision, çç 122-123,129-130, and especially 127). This shuts the door for any attempt to answer Molyneux's question in the positive. Accordingly, Berkeley remarks with respect to it that And: a nan bour blind would not at first reception of his sight think the things he say were of the same nature with the objects of tonch, or hacl anything in cornrnon with thern; but that they were a new set of ideas, perceived in a new lnanner, and entirely different fi'orn all he had perceived before: so that he would not call thern by the same narne, rlol' repute thern to be of the same sort with anything he had hitherto known (Berkeley, New Theor¡t of Vision, $ 128; cf. $$ 106, 133, 135-l36,Three Dialogues,202). It is experience, according to Berkeley, which establishes a contingent correlation between the ideas of vision and the ideas of touch, lacking any necessary oonnection between the two (cf. Berkeley, New Theory of Visiort, $$ 103-106, 1I0, Principles $ 44, Three Dialogues,202). And this contingent relation we mistake for identity: how gleat an inequality soevel'there may in our apprehension seetn to be betwixt those two things, because of the customary and close connexion that has glown up in our rninils between the objects of sight and touch; whereby the very diffelent ancl clistinct ideas of those two senses are so blended and confouncled together as to be mistaken for one and the sarne thing; or.rt of a man born blind and tnade to see would, at first opening of his eyes, [...] .,'..1,..-¡|.!. not consider the ideas of sight with refelence to, or as having any connection -.,-1 witlr, tlre ideas of touch (Berkeley, New TheorSt oJ'Vision, $ 79). has to say Very similar whichri plzzling: ,,li o.f Vi, & extension ¡rerceivable by sight are cliffelent fionr those icleas perceivecl by touch which go by the sar.ne nane". (cf. also ibicl.,49) 226 And ideas are realll¡ V/hy is it and .with everythi Even more to Leibnizian Leibniz, Nou I cl or which wou I must is hard to saÇ. by: ,.ttit: Problem? Where d their negatt straightfr Berkeley which prejudice we cannot easily extricate ourselves (Berkeley, New Theorlt of Vision, $ 79). Very similar kinds of arguments we later find in Hume. What Berkeley has to say about the role of language here is both very interesting and puzzling: And the difficulty seerns not a little incleased, because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly the satne naûre as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith it is connected: which doth of necessity arise frorn the use and end of language (Belkeley, New Theory of Visiott, $ 49; cf. also Three Dialogues,245). Why is it necessary to use one and the same word if the two kinds of ideas are really radically different fiom each other? Even more ptzzling is the following remark which seems incompatible with everything else Berkeley is saying and makes him seem very close to Leibnizian arguments for a positive answer to Molyneux's question (cf. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, II.9.8): I answer it must be acknowledged the visible square is fitter than the visible circle to lepresent the tangible square, but then it is not because it is liker, ol' Ílore of a species with it, but because the visible sqnare contains in it several distinct palts, whereby to rnark the several distinct collesponding parts of a tangible square, whereas the visible circle doth not. The square perceived by touch hath four distinct, equal sides, so also hath it four distinct equal angles. lt is thelefore necessary that the visible figure which shall be most proper to rnark it contains foul distinct equal parts correspouding to the four sides of the tangible square, as likewise four other distinct ar-rd equal parts whereby to denote the foul equal angles of the tangible square. And accordingly we see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible palts, answeling to the distinct tangible parts of the figures signified ol suggested by them (Belkeley, Nev, Theory ofVision, $ 142)' I must confess that I cannot think of an interpretation of this passage which would make it fit with the rest of Berkeley's remarks on the topic. It is hard to see how he could make this remark. PRoeLerus Mol-y¡le ux's Quesrron n¡'roltp. B¡.nKELn,r¡¡ Ansrvsn Where does all this leave Berkeley or a Berkeleian stauce on Molyneux's Þroblem? One rnight want to say that nobody could be more decisive in their negative answer to Molyneux's question. But things are not quite as straightforward as they might look at first sight. It is not even clear whether Eerkeley can accept Molyneux's question or rather would have to reject it 221 Pu'rur B¡uv¿Nl,r as basically mistaken. lt is interesting in this context that Berkeley the following remark in passing: a blind rnan from his biLth would not, at first sight, denorninate anythi saw by the names he had been used to applopriate to ideas of touch; sect. 106. Cube, sphere, table at'e words he has known applied to:thi perceivable to touch, but to things perfectly intangible he never knew applied. [...] ln short, the ideas of sight are all new perceptions to vyfil there be rlo nalnes annexed in his mind: he cannot therefore understand is said to him concerning them: and to ask of the two bodies he saw on the table, which was the sphere, which the cube? Were to hirn a questi understand the question but Berkeley himself cannot accept the Molyneux is asking. V/hy not? I think Berkeley is right here. Furthermore, not only could the person not, downright bantering and unintelligible (Berkeley, New Theory of Vision,, r 3s). object as a globe or cube when these very concepts have already been use.d! Molyneux's question concerns the possibility of recognizing a on a tactile basis. This, however, is not possible, according to Berkeley. N0È tactile concept is identical with any visual concept. I Can he reformulate the question in a way which would be acceptable t0,Ì,: him? FIe would have to index the predicates "globe" and "cube" to sense,'.Î modalities ("V" and "t"). Furthermore, he does assume that for no predicate:* Suppose a Man bom blind, and now adttlt, ancl taught by his touch to' distinguish between a Cube-t, ancl a Sphere-t of the satne tnetal, and nighly' of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t'other; which is the Cube-t, which the Sphele-t. Suppose then the Cube-t and Sphere-t placed: on a Table, and the Blind Man to be macle to see. Quaere, Whether by his sight, before he touch'd thern, he coulcl now distirguish, and tell, which iq the Globe-v, which the Cube-v. Or, to make it even clearer that tactile and visual objects and concepts are fundamentally different, let us use diffèrent tetms for the seen objects, "X" and "Y": Suppose a Man born blind, and now aclult, and taught by his touch to distingr,rish between a Cube-t, ancl a Sphere-t of the satne metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, wherr he felt one and t'other, which is the Cube-t, which the Sphere-t. Sr.rppose then the Cube-t and Sphere-t placed ott a Table, anil the Blind Man to be tnade to see. Quaere, Whether by his sight' 228 'il;iestion. It does This, howe befr whi ¡|$..someone iìather as som lñerkeleY di þerkeleY somet question? And draws the cary iWaY, too: his theory? :rl.' There are a llrBerkeley's view Ëi.',.go into two of correlation ;t: between certalû experience will types of assumption thatl dimensional, even three-di by even the visual exPeri Closely coqq "perception the subject's perceptions", 376). What we¡ objects. When Theory of Vss.i visual exper of an objectt in mysterious Berkeleian not to see would lead to based on ffansll we have objectl ?o onu PaLk 1969. before he touch'd thern, he could now distingr.rish, and tell, which is the X, which the Y. This, however, has very little, if anything to do with Molyneux's question. It does not even make sense. We should therefore not see Berkeley as someone who proposed a negative answer to Molyneux's question but rather as someóne who blocked the question from the beginning. Insofar Berkeley differs very much from Molyneux and Locke20. But doesn't Berkeley sometimes give us the impression that he wants to answer that question? And shouldn't he be able to do so? One might reply that Berkeley draws the carpet away under Molyneux's question. But this cúts the other way, too: Perhaps his inability to even formulate the question speaks against his theory? There are also more general questions -not necessarily specific toBerkeley's view on Molyneuxwhich deserve to be mentioned. I want to go into two of them. First some comments on Berkeley's ideas about the correlation between visual and tactual ideas. The experience of a correlation between certain types of tactual experience and certain types of visual experience will never give us more than just that, -a comelation. If the twotypes of experience are indeed totally different, and if we make the further assumption that visual experience in itself is non-spatial or at least not threedimensional, then it is hard to see how we should ever get to spatial, twoor even three-dimensional vision out of that correlation. This seems excluded by even the basic assumptions of the Berkeleian argument. Closely connected with this is the further point that for the Berkeleian, visual experience will always consist of what Kant called "sensation", a "percepîion that refers solely to the subject, viz., as the modification of the subject's state" (like pain, for instance); we will not get to "objective perceptions", that is, to representations of objects (Kant, KrV A 3201 B 376). Whaf we need for that, is reference to more than two-dimensional objects. When Berkeley talks about "the objects of sight" (Berkeley, New Theory of Vision, $ 49), he does not mean "object" in the usual sense. Our visual experience is, given the tserkeleian argument, not the experience of an objective world but rather a subjective experience that conelates Itt mysterious ways with objective tactile experiences. According to the Berkeleian argument, Molyneux's person could perhaps be made to see but not to see something. And even if there were some kind of mechanism that would lead to objective and spatial visual experience, the link could not be based on transfel of information and would lack all justification. Given that we have objective and spatial visual experience, the Berkeleian theory looks Molvrl¡ux's QursnoN ANDTT{E BF.tìKELEInl A¡rsu,e n '0 On a comparison of Locke's and Belkeley's reaction to Molyueux's ¡rroblern cf., among othels, Park I 969. 229 PETER [JÁUNlANN like a non-starter. A similar problem also arises for Locke and Molyneux they do not go with option (a) above and assume that visual experiences aÍê! three-dimensional from the start. ,' both Berkeley's views and the less radical ones by Locke and others (whdit did not assume that the ideas of sight and touch have nothing whatsoever in ' The second problem I wanted to mention goes a bit further and concerns common). Suppose visual and tactile representations of globes (or cubéSìî are indeed so different that the person cannot identify seen and touchéd: globes (or cubes) without further inductive expelience. Molyneux's person, would have to start with very different (tactual and visual) experiences and induction would tell her that there is a correlation between the two types of' experiences. Is this sufficient for the characteristic unity of our experiencð, as the experience of clne world? How would Molyneux's person experience the world? She would visually experience a class of objects A and tactually experience a class of objects B, and she would also find that there is a correlation between As and Bs. But there seems to be one important thing she cannot find out by induction: namely, that particular As are identical with particular Bs. It is hard to see how she should be able to find out that her visual and her tactile experience of the same object are indeed different experiences of the same object. The person would rather live in a Berkeleian "double world": one world fllled up with tactile things and the other world filled up with visual things. There would be a clear conelation but she could not find out that it is just one and the same world. Or, at least: Nothing would justify her in believing that. Moreover, we would have a good reason even to doubt that her experieuce would be of something objective2'' Given that our experience of the world is the experience of one, objective world, the experiential comelation scenario is a non-starter. It seems that we need at least some very basic closs-modal perception (certainly allowing for differences between sensual modalities) in order to be able to have the experience that we do in fact have. It seems that the objectivity of our experience presupposes its unity which in turn presupposes some cross-modality. It is interesting to see how close one gets to Kant if one thinks about these things22. Even though Kant has apparentlynot dealt with ¡4olYneux's in his Phil seems fair to Whatever w-e problematic but' Molyneux's que 2r Cf. Eilan 1993,246-251u4ro holds that the idea of an external, mind-indepenclent world requires solne cross-modality of ltlace represelìtation. Her atgumeut for this thesis does lot palallel the above argurîeut. Ganeri 2000, 647 argues in the opposite direction: Cross-modal experience ofan object presupposes that one's experience is of an objective world which it.t turn presltpposes the idea of a nurnelically identical self. 22 Cf .,of course Kant, Kl'V A 95ff., B l29ff .I leave the question open how close to Kant we should or neccl to get. 230 nell Universit¡r Atherton, M';l the MolYneux Berchielli, Li of George Be Berkeley, G'r 1957),vol. 1 ( The Works of BerkeleY, G, vols.; 1948-195' r4t-239. George BerkeleY, Luce/ T.E. J Thomas Ne keley, The Berkeley, Jessop; 9 son 1949, I Bolton, MJ Answer,,, l!l:.:t York:Oxfor4¡ Brandt, R:ì mensional 23 HoWeVer, Kant, KPV A4 24 It would r6t lyneux's reply than th9 Molyneux's question23, we can find important resources for an answer to it in his philosophy2a. Whatever we think of Kantian approaches to the Molyneux problem, it seems fair to say that Berkeley's or a Berkeleian position is not only very problematic but also sheds some skeptical light on other ways of answering Molyneux's question in the negative. Atherton, M, (1990), Berkeley's Revolution in Vision, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press. Berchielli, L. (2002), "Color, Space, and Figure in Locke:An Interpretation of the Molyneux Problem", in: Journal of the History of Philosophy 40, 47-65. Berkeley, G. "Philosophical Commentaries", iu: George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (eds.: A.A. Luce/ T.E. Jessop; 9 vols.; 19487957), vol. I (ed.:4.,{. Luce), Edinburgh etc.: Thomas Nelson Ig4B,l-140. Berkeley, G. "An Essay towards aNew Theory of Vision", in: George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (eds.: A.A. Luce/ T.E. Jessop; 9 vols.; 1948-1957), vol. I (ed.:4.4. Luce), Edinburyli etc.: Thomas Nelson 1948, 14t-239. Berkeley, G. "A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Klowledge", in: George Berkeley, The Works of Georye Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (eds.: A.A. Luce/T.E. Jessop; 9 vols.; 1948-1957), vol.2 (ed.: T.E. Jessop), Edinburgh etc.: Thomas Nelson 1949, l-113. Berkeley, G. "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonius", in: George Berkeley, The Wofts of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (eds.: A.A. Luce/ T.E. Jessop; 9 vols.; 1948-1957),vol. 2 (ecl.: T.E. Jessop), Edinburgh etc.: Thomas Nel- 'son 1949, 147-264. Bolton, M. B. (1994), "The Real Molyneux Question and the Basis of Locke's Ans,wer", in: G.A.J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy. Content and Context, New York: Oxford Univelsity Press, 75-99. Brandt, R. (1975), "Historical Observations on the Genesis of the Thr.ec-Dihensional Optical Picture" (Gassendi, Locke, Berkeley), in: Ratio 17, 176-190. Mor-yN¡ux's QutsrroN ¡t¡olne Brnr¡l¡.1¡rN Ansrven Rereneruces 23 However, lre shortly mentions Cheselden in the preface lo the Ct'itique of Practical Rectson (cf . Kant, Kpy ÂV l3). 24- , ll would reqttit'e a different paper to try to find out how Kant would ol'could have answel'ed Mo-ryneux's question. Cf. howevel Sassen 2004 who deals with a diffelent aspect of a possible l(antian reply than the one indicatecl above. 231 Prr'en Bnuv,q¡rN Perception (Philosophical Issues 7, Atascadero/CA: Ridgeview), 30 I -3 1 9. Carnpbell, J. (I996a), "Molyneux's Question", in: Enrique Villanueva (ed, cepts", in: Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues 7, dero/CA: Ridgeview), 35 1 -363. Carnpbell, J. (1996b), "Shape Properties, Experience ofShape and Shape .L.)) :,^n-^--:----^ \/:r1^--.,^-.^ /^l \ T)^..^^..+:^- /DL:l^-^^1.:^^l T..,,^t ^. Cassirer, E. (1951), The Philosophy of the Enlightenrnent, Princeton/ NJ: ceton University Press rnarr, wlro was boln blind, or lost his Sight so early, thaf he had no Rernembrancê,; Cheselden, W. "An Account of some Observations made by a young Gentle-, of ever having seeu, and was coud'd between l3 and 14 Years of Age", in: Philô¡:.iil soplrical Transactions [of the Royal Society of London] 35, 402, 1728,447-450' (reprinted in: Degenaa'^ 1996,54-56), ,,,i.. Davis, J. W. (1960), "The Molyneux Probletn", Ideas 21, 392-408. the Perception of Forms, Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer. , Diderot, D. (1875), 'ol-ettre sur les aveugles, à l'usage de ceux qui voient", in:,,:Ï Guvres Cornplètes, Paris: Garnier, vol. 1,275-342. l Eilan, N, (lgg3), "Molyneux's Question and the ldea of an External WoLldl',,.,..:.r in: Naomi Eilan/ Rosaleen McCarthy/ Bill Brewer (eds.), Spatial Represeutation: l ProblemsinPhilosoplryarrdPsyclrology,oxford:Blackwell,236-255, Evans, G. (1985), "Molyneux's Question", in: Gareth Evans, Collected Papers,r1, Oxford: Clarendon, 364-399. .., Ganeri, J. (2000), "Cross-Modality and the Self', in: Philosophy and Phenom: ., enological Research 6I, 639-657 Gregory, R. L. (1987), "Recovery from Bliudness", in: Richard L. Gregory'"' (ecl.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind, Oxford/ New York: Oxford University .' Pless, 94-96 Degenaar, M. (1996), Molyneux's Problem: Three Centuries of Discussion on Heil J. (1987), "The Molyneux Problem", in: Joumal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 77 ,227 -241". Kant, I. "Klitik der reinen Vernunft", in: Itnmanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schrift' cn ('Akadernieausgabe'), Berlin: G. Reimer lg}2ff.,vol. III (B-ed.)/ vol.IY,l'252 (A-ed.). Kant, I. "K-ritik der praktischen Vernunft", in: Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften ('Akadernieausgabe'), Berlin: G. Reirnel 1902 ff ,, vol. V, l-163. Kornblith, H. (2001), "Intemalism and Externalism: A Brief Historical Introduction", in: Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Episternology: Internalism and Externalistn, Malden/ MA: Blackwell, l-9. Leibniz, G. W. "Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entenclement Humain", in: Gottfi'ied Wilhelm Leibniz, Särntliche Schriften und Briefe (ed.: DeutscheAkademie derWis' 232 in: Journal of the History of senschaften zu Berlin), ser. 6: Philosophische Schriften (ed.: Leibniz-Forschungsstelle der Universität Münster'), vol. 6, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1962,39-527 . Levin, J, (1986), "Could Love Be like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience", in: Philosophical Studies 49,245-261, Lievers, M. (1992), "The Molyncux Problem", irì: Journal of the Histor.y of Philosophy 30, 399 -41 6. Loar; B. (1996), o'Comments on John Carnpbell "Molyneux's Question"", in: Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues 7, Atascaclero/CA: Ridgeview), 319-324. Locke, J. (1982), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ed.: Peter H. Nidditch), Oxford: Clarendon. Ludwig, K. (1996), "Shape Propeúies and Perception", in: Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues 7, Atascadero/CA: Ridgeview), 325-350. Mackie, J. L. (I976), Problems fi'om Locke, Oxford: Clarendon. Marks, L. E. (1978), Tlie Unity of the Senses. Inten'elations among the Modalities, New York etc.: Acadernic Press. Marr, D. (1982), Vision. A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information, New York: Freelnan. Molyneux, W. "Letter to the authors of the Bibliotheque universelle, 7 July 1688", in: E.S. de Beer (ed.), The Correspondence of John Locke, vol. 3, Oxford: Clarendon 197 8, 482-483. Molyneux, W. "Letter to Locke,2 March 1693", in: E.S. de Beer (ed.), The Correspondence of John Locke, vol. 4, Oxford: Clarenclon 1979, 647-652. Morgan, M. J. (1977), Molyneux's Question: Vision, Touch, and tlie Philosophy of Perception, Cambridge/ New Yolk: Carnbridge University Press. Paclrerie, E. (1997), "Du Problème de Molyneux au Ploblème de Bach-y-Rita", in: Joëlle Proust (ed.), Perception et Intermodalité. Approches Actuelles de la Question de Molyneux, Paris: Presses Universitares de France, 255-293. Park, D. (1969), "Locke and Berkeley on the Molyneux Problern", in: Journal of ihe History of ideas 30,253-260. Sassen, B. (2004), "Kant on Molyneux's Problem", in: British Joumal for the History of Philosoph5, 12,471-485. Schurnacher; R. How Does a Stick Look tliat Feels Straight? Locke and BerkeleY on the Molyneux Question, MS. _ Sclrumacher, R. (2001),"Berkeley on Visible Figule and Extension", in: Steven Daniel (ed.), Reexarnining Berkeley's Philosophy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press,108-120. Seuden, Marius Von (1932), Raumund Gestaltuffassung bei operierten BlindEeborenen vor und nach der Operation, Leipzig: Barth (Englisli translation: Space 233 Mory¡leux's Quus'r'ror'r ¡Nolr ru Il¡nrelc¡n¡.¡ Arusn,r,l¡ Prirn Bauv¡rNN and Sight. The Perception of Space and Shape in the Congenitally Blind after Operation (tr. Peter Heath), Glencoe/ IL: The Free Press 1960). Valvo, A. (1971), Sight Restoration after Long-Term Blindness: The and Behavior Patterns of Visual Rehabilitation, New York: Arnerican F for the Blind. Arclrives de Philosophie 55, 661-684. : Waxman, W. (2002), Perception and the Synthesis of Experience: Lockel lution to the Molyneux Problem, MS. Vienne, J-M, (1992), "Locke et I'intentionalité: Le problème de Molyneu* Wilson, M. D. (1999), "The Issue of "Comnlon Sensibles" in Berkeley's Theory of Vision", in: Margaret Dauler Wilsou, Ideas and Mechanism, On' Modern Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 234 PERSPECTIVAS DE LA MODERNIDAD SIGLOS )fl/I, )fl/II Y )fi/ITI PERSPECTIVAS DE LA MODERNIDAD SIGLOS }fl/I, )fl/II Y )fi/III Jean Paul Margot Mauricio Zuluaga Editores Colección Artes y Humanidades Pe.spectivas de la mode'nitrad sigros XVI, XVil y XVIil / compiracror.es Jean Parrl Margot, Maur.icio Znhtaga. -Santiago cle Cali : progr.ama Eclitor.ial Universidad del Valle, 201 I . 3l(t 1t. ;24 crn. -- (Colección ar.tes y humanidades) lnoluye bibliogr.afìa. l. Filosofía re'acentista 2. Racio.arisnlo 3. Filosofía nroderna I{istor.ia 4. Teor'ía tlel conoci¡'iento 5. Europa Vicla interectual siglos xvr-xvrl l. Margot,.lean-Paul, comp. Il. Zuluaga, Mauricio, comp. Ill. Set.ie. 190 c<l 22 ecl. At3l0l5s CEP-Elanco dc la l{epirblica-lliblioteca Luis Ángel Ar.ango Univelsidad del Valle Plograrra Editorial Títnlo: Perspectittas de la Modernictad. Sigto,s xt:r, .\yr y xyrtt Editoles: Jean Paul Margot, Mauricio Zuluaga ISBN: 978-958-670-9t2-5 Colección: Alfes y Humaniclades Primera cdición Recto'de la Universidad del Valle: Iván Enriq'e Ramos Calderó, Vicellectora de Invcstigaciones: Carolina Isaza de Lor¡r.ido Directola del Plogr.ama Editor.ial: Doris I{inestr.o za Gutiérrez O Univelsiclad del Valle O Jcan Paul Margot, Maur.icio Ztrluaga Diseño de carátula y diagr.arnación: Hngo H. Ordóñez Nievas Con'eción de estilo: Juan Carlos García M. _ G&G Eclitores hnpleso en: Litocencoa Univcrsidad del Valle Ciudad Univer.sitar.ia, Meléndez A.A. 025360 Cali, Colombia Teléfonos: 57 (2) 321 2227 Telefax: 57 (2) 330 887 7 ecl itoli al @lr.rn i val le. edu. co EI contenido de esta obra cot'resltoncle al derecho de expresión clel autor y no comprol"rìete el pensanrieuto instittlcional de la Universiclad del Valle, ui genera su responsabilidad fr.ente a terceros. El alÌtor asture la |esponsabilidad pol los derechos de autor y couexos contenidos en la obra, así como pol la eventnal infor.mación sensible en ella. Este lib|o, o parte de é1, no puede sel t'eproducido pol ningúrn medio sin antor-izaoión escrita de la [Jniversiclacl del Valle. Cali, Colombia Septicmble de 20ll PnssruraclóN ,............... ...'.'. ll CnpÍrulo 1 La pregunta fundamental de la metafísica Leiser Madanes .'...."..."'...' 13 C¡rpÍrulo 2 La Modernidad de Montaigne. Un escepticismo inédito CONTENIDO Antonio Rodrígue2 ....... Capirulo 3 La Modernidad según Montaigne Jean Claude Arnould CnpÍruro 4 La tradición, ¿amiga o enemiga de la verdad? Pico Della Mirandola y René Descafies Andrés Lema-Hincapié ,,..,........... .'..'.'..'.75 C¡,pÍruro 5 La fractura moderna entre opinión y saber: Descartes contra Montaigne Danièle Letocha .........'.'......97 l::ì ): .:;tì ,Ìi ì!!rì i-1i 'å*,... 35 5l C¿,pÍruro 6 Descart"s y Boyle: el corpusculalismo cartestano ã*o unt"""dente de la química moderna C¡rpÍrut-o 7 Estrategias escépticas y retóricas en la consttuccton discut'siva del sujeto modetno' Marcelo Mettdoza Hurtado """""""""" 125 C¡.pÍrulo 8 El escepticismo modet'n .......I4g Mauricio Zttluaga CepÍruro 9 A propósito del "more geométrico" en Descartes Y SPinoza 163 .Iean Paul Margot C¡pÍrurc 10 Spinoza Y el Problerna del rnal Jorge Atu'elio Díaz """"""""I'79 C¡,pirulo 11 John Locke: el legado de su teoría de la identidad Personal Luis Eduardo Hoyos """""" 195 CepÍrur-o 12 løåÇn"u*'t Question and the Berkeleian Answer Peter Bauntann """""" """"'217 Cnpirur-o l3 òr".n.iu subjetiva y creencia práctica: las creencias en Dios y en la inrnortalidad del alma en el "Canon delarazonpura" de Kant ........235 Catalina Gonzdlez C¡,pirulo 14 ft¡å¿" ¿" pensar' (denkunsart)' carâfer e didática ética ern Kant ........24'l Mario Nogtteira CnpÍruro 15 Kant y el problerna mente-cnerpo Lucy Carrillo ............... .......265 CapÍrwo 16 Los.sistemas de la libertad y la autocomprensión del sujeto humano Hugo Ochoa ................ ........277 C¡rpÍrur.o l7 Dialéctica y ciencia en los límites de la Modernidad. La filosofia rnoderna, vista hoy Gonzalo Set'rano